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A Land Reform Program for the Integrated Korean
Economy1
Doo-Soon Ahn
1 Introduction
Since the division of the Korean peninsula in 1945, diferent land Systems have been 
applied in South and North Korea, When the country wil be once reunified, the 
Integration of the diferent land Systems into one poses one of the most dificult 
tasks. The direction of Integration depends, inter alia, on how national reunification 
wil be realized and what kind of economic System wil be adopted after unification.
Regarding the mode of reunification, there are three diferent scenarios under 
consideration: the confederation scenario, the gradualist approach (convergence) and 
the big-bang approach. In case of the first and second scenario, there would arise 
litle problem with respect to land System Integration, because both parties would 
consult with each other and would be prepared to work out a new System suitable for 
the unified nation.
In this paper, no detailed discussions about the modus of national unification wil 
be presented. Rather, the general problems wil be put into focus that are likely to 
occur when the two diferent land Systems wil be integrated into one.
2  Historical background of the land problem in divided Korea
2.1 Distorted landownership since the division of the country
While in South Korea a market-oriented private landownership System is prevailing, 
private ownership is strictly prohibited in North Korea. The problem of diferent 
land Systems in divided Korea is connected not only with the political and economic 
Systems, but also with historical complications. Landownership has been distorted by 
the Korean War and the voluntary and non-voluntary migration of people from North 
to South and vice versa because of military, political and ideological suppressions. 
Therefore, the direction of land policy after reunification wil be influenced largely 
by the question of how those events are interpreted politicaly and regulated by law. 
Against the background of the historicaly unique experience of landownership
i This is a revised and edited version of a paper presented at the EWC/KRIHS Conference 
on „The Land Reform Process in the Post-Communist Countries“ held at East-West- 
Center, Honolulu, Hawai, Aug. 14-16, 1996.
Land Reform Program 79
Problems in Korea, there are some questions to be raised before the policy direction 
of a new land System can be discussed:
First, in March 1946, the North Korean ruling power initiated land reform. 
1,000,325 hectares of land were expropriated without any compensation, 981,390 
hectares of which were distributed to tenants. Distributed land was prohibited from 
sale, mortgage or lease.2
Second, in South Korea, agro-land reform was initiated in 1950. The principle 
was expropriation of land accompanied by compensation on the one hand and 
rationing of land to peasants with payment over time on the other.
Third, the North Korean regime was launched oficialy in 1949 and land reform 
in North Korea was caried out in March 1946 under the supervision of the Soviet 
military forces. In this connection, the question is relevant whether landownership 
change before September 1948 wil be regarded as valid or not.
The direction of ownership policy and integration of land Systems wil be influ- 
enced largely by how those events are politicaly and legaly interpreted and regu- 
lated.
2.2  Old landowners afected by the division of the country
Regarding the question of landownership, people afected are those who have lost 
their land through compulsory means such as expropriation or political and military 
Suppression. They are immigrants like:
1) North, South and overseas Koreans who had been owners of land in North Korea 
but whose land was expropriated in the course of land reform,
2) North Korean residents who had been owners of South Korean land,
3) North Korean residents who received land from the communist military forces 
that occupied South Korean teritories during the Korean War.
North Korean immigrants before and during the Korean War amounted to 3.5 
milion and 1 milion, respectively. How many of them were afected by landowner
ship change, is not known. According to a survey, 409,270 North Korean households 
were expropriated (in the course land reform) in March 1946. How many immigrated 
to the South and how many stayed in the North is also not known.3
Another survey estimates the number of South Korean immigrants to the North in 
the period around the Korean War to amount to 300,000. Most of them were col-
Jeonhoo Sohn: The experiences of land reform, Social Science Publishing, Pyongyang 
1983, quoted by Jaemyong Shin: „Processes and characteristics of North Korean land 
policy“, in: North Korea, Oct.1991, pp.129-144 (in Korean).
Cf. Minbae Kim/Minkyong Choi: „South immigrants, North Korean land and national 
unification“, in: Democratic Jurisprudence, Vol.l, Seoul 1993, pp.167-188 (in Korean).
3
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laborators of the North Korean regime and the „executers“ of land reform during the 
occupation of Southern teritory by North Korean military forces. After the commu- 
nist forces had been driven from the South, they went to the North.4
The direction of land policy after unification depends also on how these people 
are to be treated.
3 The direction of the future land System in Korea
Even if the unified Korea wil adopt a democratic and free market economic System, 
the question would stil remain whether the political and juridical measures taken by 
the North Korean regime during the division should be accepted or not. According to 
paragraph 3 of the South Korean Constitution, the North Korean regime is an ilegal 
body. Shal this be kept this way? If so, the land reform initiated by this „ilegal 
body“ would have to be nulified. In that case, al ownership changes initiated by the 
North Korean regime would have to be set back to the Situation before the division 
of the nation.
The folowing problems center on this question:
First, is land reform in North Korea an act of the Soviet military forces or an 
autonomous act of the North Korean communist regime? Depending on the answer 
to this question, the decision on ownership wil vary. If the legitimacy of the North 
Korean regime is to be negated, then al measures of this regime, including land 
reform and any other property right changes, would also have to be nulified.
Second, what kind of diferences, from a legal point of view, are there between 
land reform in the South, which was caried out during American military rule, and 
that in the North? If the legitimacy of the North Korean regime was to be recognized, 
then al the measures of this regime would also have to be recognized as efective.
Third, shal the ownership change from 1945 to 1949 and that from 1950 to 1953 
be treated within the same historical context or not? In East Germany, the land 
expropriated from 1945 to 1949 was exempted from the retum principle, because 
that was regarded as a mater of Russian sovereignty, while the other land was 
retumed or ful compensation could be received for it.
Even when the unified nation adopts a market economic System like the present 
South Korean regime, another basic question to be answered is whether the land 
System of South Korea should be extended to the new unified nation or not.
After some comparative studies between the German case and the Korean 
„would-be“ case of landownership problem, some scholars stress that the German 
solution cannot be applied to Korea without modification. The retum principle in
4 Cf. Minbae Kim/Minkyong Choi: op.cit. and also Jinwook Lee: „North Korean land policy 
after the unification - focus on the ownership problem“, in: Land Research, Vol.4, No.6, 
Land Development Corporation, Seoul, Nov.-Dec. 1993 (in Korean).
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Germany caused various kinds of confusion and problems like sluggish Investment, 
obstacles to the expansion of social overhead Capital (SOC), higher integration costs, 
lack of land supply, etc. Therefore, the return principle was actualy substituted by 
the compensation principle.
Ownership documents in East Germany were available in relatively good condi
tion and oficialy more than 45% of land was in private possession in 1989. In the 
case of North Korea, private ownership has not been alowed and al kinds of 
registration documents were destroyed intentionaly, so that identification of the real 
owner wil be much more dificult than in the case of Eastern Germany. Most of the 
first generation of immigrants from North Korea is no longer alive. And many of 
their families got separated, so that heirship is complicated.
Al these factors together make it impossible to avoid social complications and 
juridical disputes.5
A dramatic change of the land System in North Korea, where a socialist land Sys
tem prevailed since the division of the country, would lead to confusion. Confusion 
might also arise when the cooperative farms would be transformed into private 
farms, because „there are no farmers, but only farm laborers in North Korea“.6
In the design of the land System integration program, special atention must be 
paid to the interests of those people who have lived in North Korea during the whole 
period of division and have never had a chance to hold private property because of 
the communist System. By the time of unification, they could not only become poorer 
in absolute as wel as relative terms but would also be threatened by a removal from 
their ground, on which they have depended for their living so far. The solution of the 
ownership problem demands also suficient consideration of these people’s interests.
4 Some policy measures to integrate the landownership System
4.1 Policy options
In order to work out some suggestions for land System integration in Korea, one must 
consider, among others, the folowing factors:
1) How should the transition period of System integration be managed?
2) In finding the solution to landownership, should the private property right aspect 
or the national economic aspect be given priority?
According to a survey, only 7% out of 700 questioned North Korean immigrants possess 
their old ownership documents. Cf. W.K. Kim; „What shal be done with the North 
Korean land problem after the reunification?“, in: Monthly Chosun, Nov. 1993, pp.494- 
503 (in Korean).
Ibid.6
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3) How should the living Standard of the North Korean people be secured and how 
can an opportunity to obtain their „starting property“ be given to them?
4) What measures should be taken to prevent land speculation in the teritory of 
North Korea?
If the retum principle were to be applied, there wil arise, inter alia, three serious 
Problems. First, the financial bürden wil dampen North Korean economic recovery, 
which in tum wil have an impact on the Korean economy as a whole. Second, in 
Order to identiy the former owners of the land a lot of juridical and administrative 
eforts wil be required. Third, the interests of the tenants of the land and the North 
Korean inhabitants in general wil be hurt seriously.
Al these points imply that the land problem requires a very cautious approach. 
Considering the complexities of the land problems mentioned above, there are a 
number of proposals, most of which can be regarded as transitional in nature:
1) To keep al real estate in the hands of the state as national ownership. In this case, 
priority should be given to reserving land for the regional economic reconstruc- 
tion of North Korea, at least until a comprehensive national development plan 
wil be completed.
2) The cooperatives’ ownership should be transformed into state ownership, but 
private ownership should be alowed for a limited amount of land, for example, 
for housing and self-cultivating farm land as wel as for self-managed private 
economic activities.
3) Instead of introducing the South Korean private ownership-oriented land System 
a „user-oriented“ land System should be introduced to the North, at least during a 
limited span of time.
4) North Korean land should be privatized gradualy according to a privatization 
schedule.
These alternatives are not exclusive but complementary to each other. So, any 
combinations of them are possible for policy implementation.
4.2 The necessity of privatization
Al countries that are undergoing System transformation consider privatization of 
national properties as an unavoidable political step. And real estate is not exempted. 
There is no doubt that private property rights constitute an indispensable substance 
of a democratic market economy. This does not necessarily imply an immediate 
transformation of the land System in terms of a big bang. Privatization must not be 
accomplished at once but rather step by step when the purpose of land use is clari- 
fied. Not only the „cost“ of national unification but also the future wel-being of the 
whole nation heavily depends on the direction of land policy. Once unification wil
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be efected, conflicts wil emerge between old landowners and those people whose 
living foundations depend on that land. Therefore, social and economic chaos can be 
avoided only when North Korean land - actualy the only wealth of North Korea as a 
whole - wil be managed with national wel-being in mind. Transformation of 
ownership may thus proceed gradualy, i.e. according to a plan of successive privati- 
zation.
A clear-cut guideline must be drawn from the question of how land wil be pri- 
vatized and who wil have priority in acquisition. For example, the land that belongs 
to farmers’ cooperatives can be privatized and the members of the cooperatives 
concemed wil have priority in acquisition. But because they wil not be in a position 
to pay for the land, they can be granted the usufruct right to cultivate it until they wil 
be able to pay in several years’ time and to secure ownership of the land.
A leasehold System can be applied at the beginning stage of transformation. But 
this can be regarded only as a transitional Step before the privatization process and 
not as final solution because a leasehold System only in the area of North Korea 
would mean a permanent Separation of the land market in one and the same country. 
Furthermore, a nation-wide leasehold System wil produce an enormous amount of 
administrative work which might be accompanied by arbitrary intervention and 
coruption.
5  Diferent ways of privatization for diferent uses of land
The teritory of North Korea comprises an area of 122,762 km". 17.4% of it is 
agricultural farm land, 76.5% forests and 6.1 % serve other purposes. It is divided in 
five categories: agricultural farm land, forests, urban land, land for special purposes, 
and others.7
Diferent patems of land use lead to diferent ways of privatization of the once 
socialized land. For example, the German privatization agency Treuhandanstalt 
(THA) distinguishes five diferent processes of privatization. They are: a) free sale, 
b) bidding (Bietverfahren), c) limited open tender (beschränkte Ausschreibung), d) 
public open tender (öfentliche Ausschreibung) and e) public auction (öfentliche 
Auktion). To which category land wil belong depends on the patem of land use or 
its purpose in terms of economic and urban development.8
At the initial stage of German land privatization, the Option of free sale was ap
plied most frequently, especialy when the production unit concemed had concluded 
a Cooperation agreement with a West German partner. In the bidding process, only
For more details cf. Haeung Ryu: „Land use System of North Korea“, in: Land Research, 
Korea Land Development Corporation, Seoul, Jul.-Aug. 1993, esp. Tab.2, p.l 16.
For a very detailed description and analysis of the privatization work in Germany cf. 
Wolfram Fischer et. al. (eds.): Treuhandanstalt, Das Unmögliche wagen, Forschungsbe
richte, Berlin 1993.
84 Koreanische Halbinsel
such limited and selected potential investors were invited who were considered to be 
suitable and qualified to take over the objects in question. Most Companies belong- 
ing to the Chemical, paper, iron and Steel industries in East Germany have been 
privatized by means of this process. The third way of privatization, limited open 
tender, has been applied to smal and medium-sized industrial firms with a relatively 
simple internal structure.
The fourth way of privatization, public open tender, draws special atention. By 
means of this process, more than 30,000 retail business units in East Germany were 
privatized by January 1991. Even though this was the process of public open tender, 
in most cases, only East German inhabitants were qualified to participate in the 
bidding. This process is also caled „smal privatization“ and is distinguished from 
the „big bang“ that was applied to most industrial firms of former East Germany.9 
Public auction was never applied in the course of privatization in East Germany.
In the folowing, the methods and sequences of privatization for various kinds of 
land in North Korea wil be discussed.
5.1 Privatization of land for housing and lodging facilities
Even though private ownership in North Korea is not alowed, it is known that the 
usufruct right of family houses or apartments is recognized. This usufruct right can 
be extended after unification. But because the quality and market value of residential 
facilities vary, it is not fair to transfer the usufruct right directly to ownership without 
any complementary measures. Rather, it is worthwhile to privatize residential 
facilities immediately after unification. But this may not happen in the sense that the 
„occupant“ automaticaly becomes the owner of the facilities. Rather, the „occupant“ 
wil be granted the pre-emptive right so that he can acquire the facilities and lands in 
question against payment.10
Needless to say that most North Korean inhabitants are not in a position to pay 
for a house or an apartment. Therefore, their interests must be protected in such a 
way that they should be privileged to acquire their residential facilities much cheaper 
than at market price and be alowed to pay for them in a step-by-step manner over 
several years.
For more details of the strategy of privatization cf. K.D. Schmidt: „Strategien der 
Privatisierung“, in: W. Fischer et. al.: Das Unmögliche wagen, op.cit., pp.211-240.
In this context, the experiences of Russian housing privatization are suggestive. To 
occupants of residential facilities, up to 18 m2 per family member ownership was granted 
free of Charge, while exceeding space was alowed only against payment. Prices were set 
according to the size of exceeding space. When occupied space was less than 18m2 per 
family member, financial compensation was granted. Transactions conceming residential 
facilities were alowed only after some time had elapsed.
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5.2 Privatization of agricultural farm lands
17.4% of North Korean land is used for agricultural purposes with farm land ac- 
counting for the biggest share in North Korea. Also, about 37% of the whole popu- 
lation is involved in agricultural activities.11 From this data, one can see how impor
tant the right approach to the question of landownership can be.1' In order to protect 
the interests of farmers, they must be given a chance to acquire farm land even after 
some time when they wil be in a position to pay for it. Long-term loans, low interest 
rates, payment over time and other preferential measures should be ofered to them.
In 1963, the last year for which statistics are available, there were 3,732 agro- 
cooperatives with 1,837,000 hectares of Felds and 190 state-owned farms with 
159,000 hectares of Felds.13 According to the latest statistics, North Korean agricul
tural land now covers 2,141,000 hectares, 69.9% of which are dry Felds and 30.1% 
are rice paddy Felds.14
Presuming that the land of the 190 state-owned farms wil be preserved under 
state ownership even aFer uniFcation, the agro-land to be privatized wil comprise 
1,837,000 hectares that are owned by cooperatives. This can be privatized in various 
ways: grants to individual farmers with no compensation, ownership transfer to 
cooperatives, privatization by sales, etc.
Sales of land do not necessarily mean that the Fee market principle must be ap
plied Fom the very beginning. North Korean inhabitants have been prevented 
systematicaly Fom accumulating wealth and are not alowed to own land. Therefore, 
they Frst must be given an opportunity to acquire farm land. The so-caled 
„minimum bang“ approach is recommendable. This means, among other things, that 
land wil not be sold to the person who ofers the highest price. Rather the right to 
acquire farm land must be restricted to those people who have been farmers and 
members of agro-cooperatives and who intend to be farmers in the future.15
In North Korea, the efective working units of agriculture are not the coopera
tives themselves but their subunits, the so-caled sojo, which comprise 5 to 15
11 Based on data of the Board of National UniFcation. Cf. also Haeung Ryu: „The land use 
System of North Korea“, op.cit.
12 Cf. D.S. Park: „Community farms in North Korea and the land problems after 
reunification“, in: North Korea, Oct. 1993, pp.121-129 (in Korean).13 Cf. Chung, Joseph Sang-Hoon: The North Korean Economy. Structure and Development, 
Hoover Institution Press, Stanford 1974, p.33.14 Data from the Board of National Unification.
15 For more details of the diferent sequences and strategies of privatization cf. S. Johnson/ 
H. Krol: Strategy, Structure and Spontaneous Privatization, Washington, D.C. 1992 and 
also IMF: Privatization in East Germany. A Survey of Curent Issues, IMF Working Paper 
WP/92/8, 1992.
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households. It is recommended to dissolve the cooperatives into subunits and then to 
grant the right to acquire agro-land to these subunits.16
5.3 Privatization of industrial and commercial estates
In terms of organizational form, the industrial production units in North Korea are 
either national corporations (kukyoung kiupso) or combinates iyonhap kiupso). They 
possess not only the plant sites for the production process but oversee also many 
subordinated work brigades for special purposes.
Since investment in the industrial sector has a primary importance for the devel
opment of the future Korean economy as a whole, the privatization of industrial 
estates must be caried out with the aim of inducing potential investors from South 
Korea as wel as from foreign countries.
There are many ways of privatization of land for industrial and commercial pur
poses, depending on the circumstances. Coupons or vouchers, for example, can be 
distributed to the population as shares of „the people’s property“ or a commerciali- 
zation process can be introduced before privatization begins.
For hotels and restaurants, retail shops, Service firms and firms of handicrafts- 
manship as wel as for smal-scale industrial firms, the so-caled „smal-scale 
privatization“ can be applied. By this method ownership can be given to a private 
person either through an open bidding procedure and public sales or to persons with 
pre-emptive rights. Management buy-out (MBO)/management buy-in (MBI) can also 
be considered as a kind of smal-scale privatization.17
The main purposes of smal-scale privatization are the folowing two: reactiva- 
tion of the North Korean Service sector and smal and medium-sized enterprises 
through a prompt commercialization of these sectors, and promotion of local (North 
Korean) inhabitants’ participation in the capitalization of national property. There- 
fore, it is recommended to alow only North Korean inhabitants to participate in this 
privatization process so that some „starting property“ wil be granted to them.
For large state-owned firms and combinates, „large-scale privatization“ should be 
undertaken. The main objective here is not the promotion of local entrepreneurship 
or distribution of national property to local inhabitants but the inducement of
Poland has experimented with self-determination of farm landownership by entitling the 
members of a cooperative to elect a representative of their cooperative and to treat the 
ownership problem intemaly in a democratic way. Cf. D. Mario Nuti: „Privatization of 
Social Economies. General Issues and the Polish Case“, in: H. Blommestein/M. Marese 
(Hrsg.): Transformation of Planned Economies. Property Rights Reform and Macroeco- 
nomic Stability, OECD 1991.
In Germany, until February 1994, out of 13,643 privatized firms, 2,591 were MBO/MBI. 
Cf. Treuhandanstalt: Dokumentation 1990-1994, Bd.l4/VI: Neuordnungen der Agrar
struktur, pp.92.
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investment Capital and technological and managerial know-how into the North 
Korean economy.
Even though the plant sites are, in many cases, the only valuable assets of indus
trial firms in North Korea, special atention must be paid to the privatization of these 
firms in order that the estates wil be used for industrial activities after privatization. 
Otherwise, potential investors might be interested only in the aquisition of land and 
not in the Operation of production activities of the firms concemed. In the later case, 
plants would have to shut down, production would come to an end and employees 
would be laid of on a massive scale, so that the region concemed would be ruined 
industrialy.
Industrial complexes possess land not only for direct production purposes. There- 
fore, a clear division of land categories is necessary before the privatization negotia- 
tions wil begin.18
6 Further policy considerations regarding land System Integra­
tion
6.1 Measures to be taken in the transitional period
When North and South Korea wil once be unified, economic integration of both 
parts wil take more than just a few years. The economic gap between them wil have 
to be narowed and political Consensus wil be necessary in many aspects. One 
important point over which consensus exists seems to be that North Korean land, 
even if it was once expropriated, cannot be the property of a certain individual 
person or a group of people. Rather, after unification, North Korean land wil have to 
be regarded as a public good that serves the wel-being of the whole nation.
Some basic studies and surveys about the land use patem and the geographic 
Information System are indispensable for the integration of the land System.
In East Germany, for example, THA separated the land that was not directly related to 
production activities from the firms to be privatized and commissioned this land to its 
daughter Organization, Liegenschaftsgeselschaft der Treuhandanstalt mbH (TLG), in order 
to seil it for other purposes. Al land except that for agricultural purposes and forests are to 
be privatized by TLG, which was established in 1991. Lor the detailed report on the 
activities of TLG, cf. Treuhandanstalt: Dokumentation 1990-1994, Bd.8: Liegenschaften 
und Wohnungsprivatisierungen, Berlin 1995, pp.341-581.
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6.2 Measures to secure the living foundations of North Koreans and to 
guard against the land speculation
The restitution principle applied in Germany after unification held various kinds of 
uncertainty for investors. Even though the property law was amended in an earlier 
stage of Integration to loosen the return principle, the expected economic boom was 
delayed in Eastem Germany for longer than expected.
The economic gap between the North and the South is big. The GNP per capita 
of North Korea is about one tenth (1996) of that of the South. Besides, people in the 
South have accumulated property as much as they could, while their neighbors in the 
North were not alowed to have property. With these facts in mind, some measures 
are urgently needed to Support the North Korean population in the process of 
accumulating property. The folowing measures can be considered: First, distribution 
of social and national property in North Korea to the people living there in the form 
of Coupons or vouchers; second, distribution of some portion of the land to North 
Koreans; third, supply of land exclusively to North Korean end-users (inhabitants) in 
the form of leasehold, usufruct, or ownership on favorable terms.
The new ownership arangement must not widen the wealth gap between North 
and South, which is already broad. A sel-out of North Korean land to speculators 
must be avoided.
6.3 Seting up an Institution in Charge of land System integration
The institutional framework for privatization policy in reform countries varies from 
country to country.19 Whathever institutional form may be chosen, some policy 
considerations are nesessary to take into account the special position of leaseholders, 
pre-emptive tenants and occupants, workers and members of cooperatives, etc.
At this moment, it is dificult to discuss what form of institution and what organ- 
izational structure wil be most suitable to accomplish the task of land System 
integration. It depends heavily on the mode, timing and sequencing of national 
unification and economic integration of the two parts. But the chosen institution must 
cary out the folowing works in a functional and periodical manner:
Land reform institutions can be identified as the folowing three types: First, the central 
and/or regional govemment is involved directly in privatization and restructuring of the 
ownership patem. For example, Poland and the Czech Republic established a Ministry of 
Privatization as part of the cabinet. Second, some countries set up a new institution to deal 
with privatization and restructuring tasks. German THA and Hungarian SPA (State 
Privatization Agency) are the most wel-known examples. Third, some countries alow 
members of cooperatives, managers and workers of combinates, brigades and other 
production units to deal with „their“ properties and to solve ownership problems 
intemaly.
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First, in order to prepare land policy after national unification, an institution must 
be established soon. This institution must be equipped with
- a data base and a GIS (geographic information System) for al kinds of informa- 
tion regarding land in North and South Korea,
- staf qualified to appraise and evaluate the land and other national property,
- a regional and nationwide business information network to prepare structural 
adjustment and urban development in the course of the economic integration of 
North and South Korea.
Second, once Korea is unified, an integrated land System should be adopted in North 
as wel as in South Korea. In order to implement this System, a public institution in 
Charge of privatization should be established. This institution can be regarded as a 
procurator of the state whose task is is to deal with potential claimants and buyers of 
land which has been designated by state authorities for gradual privatization. But the 
planning and coordination of land policy as wel as the control of privatized land 
must be retained by state authorities, so that the function of the new institution is 
limited to the privatization of land.
7 Summary and conclusion
The ownership question vis-ä-vis North Korean land after national unification can 
not be answered in the context of the South Korean Constitution alone. Rather, the 
solution must be in accordance with the political, economic and historical context. If 
land was to be retumed to the old owners, there would not only arise huge 
„unification costs“ but also social and economic crisis that might wel threaten 
national stability.20
Among other things, we can expect the folowing problems:
First, confusion regarding the real estate price System. Because a real estate mar
ket has not yet been established, an introduction of new ownership rules in North 
Korea would lead to price instability of real estate, which in tum would influence 
house rents and prices of daily necessities.
Second, unequal opportunities for North and South Koreans to acquire real es- 
tates. If North Korean real estate were to be privatized without any supplementary 
measures, ownership of real estate would be concentrated in the hands of South 
Koreans because North Koreans wil not be in a position to pay for a real estate. This 
would widen the North-South gap even more than before privatization.
Third, shortage of land for public uses. If old ownership Claims were to be recog- 
nized and other real estate were to be privatized, the long-term needs of the public
20 Cf. M.B. Kim/M.K. Choi: op.cit.
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sector and the needs of commercial and industrial users would not be satisfied so that 
national economic development would be confronted with land shortage problems.
In anticipation of these contingencies, the desirable direction of policy measures 
can be summarized as folows:
1) The coordination of landownership questions and economic Integration needs 
detailed preparation, which should be undertaken already in the transition period. 
In Order to gain time for preparation, a transitional period of System transforma- 
tion should be considered. In this time period, North Korean teritory would be 
treated as a „special economic zone“.
2) In order to prevent massive landownership disputes in case of an unprepared 
reunification, some political decisions and national consensus should be reached 
before turbulences wil arise.
3) The living foundations of North Koreans must be guaranteed. This can be 
achieved by giving occupants a guaranty of the usufruct right to the land as long 
as they wil buy it or give it back to the state.
4) Over the last 50 years, North Koreans have had no chance to accumulate private 
property. In order to narow the wealth gap vis-ä-vis South Koreans, some policy 
measures are urgently needed. North Koreans may be granted the usufruct right, 
which can be extended to the pre-emptive right to buy the land for their own use. 
These Privileges are, however, subject to the restriction of transactions for some 
time so that speculative transactions can be prevented.
5) In the privatization process, diferent sequences and methods must be applied to 
diferent kinds of land for diferent purposes and with diferent patems of use:
- Agricultural land cannot be privatized at the beginning of the process of land 
System Integration because the tenants, mostly members of the agricultural 
cooperatives in North Korea, are not in a position to finance the acquisition of 
land. Therefore, leasehold and usufruct right should be given to, and only to, 
local farmers who also hold the pre-emptive right to buy the land later.
- Residential houses and atached sites must be sold primarily to the occupants 
or other local families. Considering the weak financial position of these peo- 
ple, aquisitions wil be supported financialy and administratively.
- Hotels, restaurants, retail shops and other smal Service facilities must be pri
vatized as early as possible, with the pre-emptive right given to local inhabi- 
tants so that their economic activities wil be promoted and the pressure on 
labor market wil be reduced.
- Combinates, industrial and other large estates for commercial and industrial 
purposes must be privatized in such a way that, in the short run, the industrial
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subsistence of North Korea wil be sustained and massive Capital and tech
nology-intensive investment from South Korea and from abroad can be in- 
duced afterwards.
- Land for SOC, other public facilities and al forests must be kept under state 
ownership. The same can be said of such agricultural and forest areas that are 
suitable and/or necessary for urban development or industrial and commercial 
activities.
Acquisition rights to land that hosts smal shops, restaurants, other per
sonal Service activities, etc. should be granted exclusively to North Koreans 
and payment can be spread over several years. The revenue from privatization 
of other large sites can be used to build up SOC and/or distributed to North 
Korean inhabitants in the form of Coupons or vouchers.
6) In order to integrate land Systems in a united Korea, an independent institution 
should be set up. This institution would have the task to identify the goals of land 
policy, to appraise the objects concemed, to deal with potential buyers of the 
relevant objects, to grant usufruct right and pre-emption of certain categories of 
land, etc.
7) Al lands and sites that are not used for direct production purposes should be 
preserved for a comprehensive nationwide development plan. Special atention 
must be paid to the long term-demand for land in line with SOC needs and public 
usage.
